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Abstract 
 
In recent years it seems that both regions and cities appear to have 
become more eager to present themselves as regions or cities in which new or 
mobile firms in certain industrial sectors (especially perhaps biotechnology) 
should locate. At the same time, in the UK at least, there has been devolution of 
the administration of regional policy, albeit with specific targets being set by the 
national government. Thus cities and regions have become, at least in part, more 
able to combine their publicity with financial support for the particular industrial 
sector they wish to foster.  
In this paper a model is developed which has the following properties. 
Cities allocate monies between two types of expenditure, (i) support for a nascent 
industry and (ii) support for social policies, with payoffs that differ for different 
cities. It is shown that, if firms in the nascent industry are attracted by relatively 
high levels of support, cities will generally spend more on industrial support than 
the national government would.  
This simple model is similar to those developed in the literature on Tax 
Competition. This feature allows a commentary to be made on both the policy 
implications and possible extensions of the model.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 In many economies regional or urban authorities take the responsibility of 
fostering, to some extent at least, the development of new industries by 
encouraging start-ups and supporting small firms through awarding grants or tax 
relief and through providing advice. In the U.K. as elsewhere, such industrial 
support is common and, although many industries benefit from the support 
offered by regional authorities, in the recent past attention has been directed 
towards the bio-technology industries. The local authorities are encouraged to 
support such nascent industries because they perceive that the rewards to the 
locality from a flourishing industry will repay their investment at the early stage of 
development.  
 However it is not clear that such intervention in the market is necessarily 
beneficial to the nation at large. Whilst accepting that support for such nascent 
industries at early stages in their development may well be worth while, 
entrusting the intervention to the local agents may lead to a competition between 
jurisdictions. In this paper a model is developed that captures this possibility. 
Government can choose to support initiatives which have no regional spillovers 
or to support initiatives which do have an inter-regional dimension. It is shown 
that, when supporting nascent industrial development has a negative affect on 
the efficacy of other jurisdictions’ industrial support, then local governments will 
not divide their support between the two categories of expenditure in the same 
proportion as would be chosen by the national government.   
 This result is similar to results to be found in the literature on tax 
competition. Wilson (1999) provides a useful overview of that literature, whilst 
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Wildasin (1989) considers directly the problem of fiscal externalities. In the UK 
recently there has been a shift towards more a decentralised regional policy (HM 
Treasury, 2003). However this shift has been accompanied by the imposition of 
targets for local regional policy set by the national government. Learmonth and 
Swales (2005) using a similarly motivated model as that developed in this paper 
consider the operation of such target driven regional policy in situations where 
there are fiscal externalities. At the outset it should be noted that here it is 
assumed that all regional finance is disbursed from the national government. 
Thus local government does not raise its own revenue. The model would 
therefore be more applicable to local authority behaviour in the UK, where much 
local finance comes in the form of a block grant from central government, rather 
than to a system involving a more highly devolved tax raising structure.  
 
2. THE MODEL  
 It is assumed that any region can choose to spend its budget in one of two 
ways. First it may choose to spend money on region specific social policies. It is 
assumed that if xr is the level of this type of expenditure in Region r then the 
returns to such expenditure are given by { }rr xS.α ,. The value of αr reflects the 
degree of deprivation of the region, the larger is αr the greater is the effect of any 
level of expenditure. It is assumed that the function S is a monotonic increasing 
function of xr and that it is subject to decreasing returns. Further it should be 
noted that this type of expenditure exhibits no spillover effects.  
 Second the region may choose to support a nascent industry (or 
industries). If it commits yr to this it will achieve a return of { }rr yT.β , where βr is a 
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measure of how well endowed the region is to exploit the potential of the nascent 
industry. So, for example, β could be higher in regions within which there are 
universities researching in the area or where there is already a flourishing small 
firm network. Again the function, T, exhibits positive and decreasing returns to 
expenditure.  
 However there is another dimension of this expenditure that should be 
captured. New firms in nascent industries are assumed to be somewhat 
footloose. Thus, other things being equal, they will be attracted to regions where 
support levels are higher. This suggests that the returns to this type of 
expenditure in Region r will additionally depend on whether the expenditure by 
Region r is above or below the average expenditure of all regions. This additional 
factor may be written as { }yyD r − . It is assumed that the function D is common 
across all regions and is strictly increasing in{ }yyr − . It is further assumed that 
this distributional effect sums to zero over the complete set of regions in the 
nation.  
 i.e  { }∑
=
=−
R
r
r yyD
1
0  
 We may write the gains to be derived by a region from its expenditure as  
 { } { } { }yyDyTxSB rrrrrr −++= .. βα  
  
 
2. A NATIONAL POLICY 
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 In this section a solution is given to the question of what allocation of 
resources a national government would make when faced with the returns 
functions given in the previous section. For the nation consisting of R regions the 
returns to regional expenditure are given by 
 
{ } { } { }[ ]
{ } { }∑∑
∑
==
=
+=
−++=
R
r
rr
R
r
rr
R
r
rrrrr
yTxS
yyDyTxSB
11
1
..
..
βα
βα
 
 It is supposed that the national government has determined the total 
amount that it is prepared to devote to regional assistance. Let this amount be z. 
The national government’s problem then is to maximise the returns subject to a 
budget constraint.  
i.e. 
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Constructing the Lagrangean function gives  
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This has to maximised with respect to x1.....xR , y1 ....yR and λ giving  
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Solving these implies that for any two regions r and s,  
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So the national government gives relatively more monies to those regions who 
are in greatest social need (high α) and to those regions that are well placed to 
benefit from the nascent industries (high β).  
3. REGIONAL POLICY 
 Suppose that the nation decides on the total levels of disbursement 
[ ]( )*** rrr yxz +=  as determined in the previous section but allows the regional 
authorities to have discretion on how to allocate their budget between social and 
industrial policies. It is assumed that, although the returns to industrial policy are 
interdependent, any particular region will assume that the industrial policy 
expenditures of other regions will remain fixed irrespective of what that particular 
region chooses to do. In other words the regions are assumed to operate in a 
manner equivalent to standard Cournot oligopolists in industrial economics. The 
region’s problem may be written as 
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The Langrangean is  
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and the first order conditions are 
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Suppose the solution of this optimisation is given by ### ,, rrr yx λ . Notice that the 
sum of #rx  and 
#
ry  will be 
*
rz  as in the case when the national government 
decides on the local allocations between social and industrial policy 
expenditures. However when the regional authority is responsible for the 
allocation the division is determined by the equation  
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When the national government takes responsibility for the allocation the division 
is given by the equation  
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 Thus the division arrived at by the regional authority ( ## , rr yx ) will be one in 
which the expenditure on industrial policy is greater and the expenditure on social 
policy less than in the case when the division is made by the national authority. 
This is entirely due to the interregional feature of the model. The national 
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government is not concerned with the relative position of regions. However 
regions are conscious of their comparative position with respect to industrial 
support.  
 
4. COMMENTARY  
 In this paper a model has been built which has the property that regions 
compete with each other in the fostering of nascent industries. This competition 
stems from the fact that the returns to expenditure at a regional level depend not 
only on the amount of support a region allocates to nascent industries but also on 
the support offered by the region relative to the support offered by other regions. 
Given the interdependence of the returns functions, any region would choose to 
spend more of a given budget on support to this nascent industry and 
consequently less on local social policies that have no spill-over effects. Such 
“distortion” might be lessened if local authorities were constrained by the centre 
to spend a predetermined sum on such social needs or if they had to meet fixed 
outcome targets in that sphere of operation.   
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